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History, Value, and Irreplaceability*
Erich Hatala Matthes
It is often assumed that there is a necessary relationship between historical value
and irreplaceability, and that this is an essential feature of historical value’s distinc-
tive character.Contrary to this assumption, I argue that it is amerely contingent fact
that some historically valuable things are irreplaceable, and that irreplaceability
is not a distinctive feature of historical value at all. Rather, historically significant
objects, from heirlooms to artifacts, offer us an otherwise impossible connection
with the past, a value that persists even in the face of suitable replacements.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ASSUMPTION
The past has a curious power: it plays a distinctive role in shaping our eval-
uative and practical relationships with persons, places, objects, and prac-
tices. On its own, a cracked shard from a clay pot may seem worthless—
unearthed from Machu Picchu, it becomes a landmark on the map of a
people’s past. This transformation can occur in even the most personal of
contexts. G. A. Cohen writes of an eraser that he carried with him for the
entirety of his academic career; to you or me, it would be a worn piece of
rubber, but to him it was a cherished memento.1
1. G. A. Cohen, “Rescuing Conservatism: A Defense of Existing Value,” in Reasons and
Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon, ed. R. JayWallace, Rahul Kumar, and Sam-
uel Freeman ðNew York: Oxford University Press, 2011Þ, 203–30, 221.
* For helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay, I would like to thank Kinch
Hoekstra, the wonderful graduate community at Berkeley, audience members at the Sym-
posium on Current Questions in Authenticity convened by the Berkeley Society for Cultural
Heritage, Arts, and the Law in February 2012, as well as Sarah Buss and two reviewers for this
journal. Extraordinary thanks are owed to Niko Kolodny and Jay Wallace for providing out-
standing feedback on many early drafts of this essay and for being paragons of dissertation
advising. And special thanks to Jackie Hatala Matthes for always being there for me—some-
thing that is simple to express but difficult to do.Work on this essay was supported in part by a
Sawyer Seminar Graduate Fellowship from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Finally, I owe
an important debt of gratitude to G. A. Cohen for his thought-provoking essay on particular
value. Though I disagree with him at some length here, Cohen’s work played an essential role
in prompting my thinking on this topic. I regret that I never had the chance to meet him.
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One of the most prominent features of this historical mode of val-
uation is the sense that objects valued for their histories do not admit
of replacement.2 Cohen writes: “I would hate to lose this eraser. I would
hate that even if I knew that it could be readily replaced, not only, if I
so wished, by a pristine cubical one, but even by one of precisely the
same off-round shape and the same dingy colour that my eraser has
now acquired. There is no feature that stands apart from its history that
makes me want to keep this eraser. I want my eraser, with its history.
What could bemore human than that?”3 Or, in the words of JohnMartin:
“Keepsakes, souvenirs, relics, heirlooms, and objects of historical impor-
tance, like the original manuscript of the Declaration of Independence
or the Crown of St. Stephen, are irreplaceable, like art objects, in part
because of their history.”4 Contrary to the commonly assumed relation-
ship between historical value and irreplaceability, in this essay I will ar-
gue that there is no necessary connection between them. This is a surpris-
ing conclusion given the prevalence of cases in which irreplaceability
is thought to be necessary to historical value, either because historically
valuable things are assumed to therefore be irreplaceable, or because ir-
replaceability is regarded as an essential criterion of historical value in
the first place. For instance, consider how we commonly understand the
value of personal relationships. Why doesn’t the love you bear for your
partner transfer to a clone, or to another person who “better” instantiates
his or her qualities? It is at least in part because that other person lacks
the unique historical relationship that you share with your partner.5 Or
take our evaluative attitudes toward artistic forgeries, for instance, Van
Meegeren’s forged Vermeers. Because VanMeegeren’s paintings lack the
right kind of history ðnamely, having been painted by VermeerÞ, they are
considered inauthentic and are thus not valuable in the sameway as a true
Vermeer—a true Vermeer is irreplaceable. Similar considerations can
even emerge in the context of the natural environment. What might be
thought to make a certain environment count as “natural” is that it has
a unique history that cannot be replaced: “It is the fact of their embody-
2. A brief note on terminology: I use “historical significance” in discussing objects that
have significant ðfor whatever reasonÞ historical properties. Such significance need not
have, and indeed often lacks, a positive valence. I use “historical mode of valuation” to refer
to the way in which one might value an object for its historically significant properties.
One of course need not always value an object with historically significant properties in
this way. I use “historical value” to refer to objects which warrant the historical mode of
valuation.
3. Cohen, “Rescuing Conservatism,” 221.
4. John N. Martin, “The Concept of the Irreplaceable,” Environmental Ethics 1 ð1979Þ:
31–48.
5. Compare Niko Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” Philosophical Review 112
ð2003Þ: 135–89.
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ing a particular history that blocks the substitutability of natural objects
by human equivalents, rather than, for example, the inability to replicate
their function . . . natural objects have value for what they are, and spe-
cifically for the particular history that they embody.”6
These otherwise diverse cases are alike in suggesting that objects
worth valuing for their histories are necessarily irreplaceable.7 Moreover,
because the precise relationship between historical value and irreplace-
ability has been vague in the literature, for the sake of clarity it behooves
us to consider the possibility that irreplaceability might be sufficient for
securing historical value as well. In either case, the examples considered
so far make clear that irreplaceability is supposed to be a central feature
of why we value historically significant objects in the distinctive way that
we do. However ðand this is a point we will return toÞ, it is worth valuing
an object as irreplaceable only if that object is in fact irreplaceable in a
meaningful way.8 What objects are irreplaceably valuable, and why? This
will be one of our central questions. But for starters, it cannot merely be
the fact that an object has a particular history that blocks its substitut-
ability: after all, everything has a particular history. There is consequently
some sense in which all things are irreplaceable, but it is not obvious
that there is anything significant about that.9 It seems false to our ex-
perience that we value everything ðor even most thingsÞ as irreplaceable,
and this is because most things are not meaning fully irreplaceable and
hence do not warrant such evaluative attitudes. Often, we are happy to
accept replacements. If my umbrella is stolen, a replacement is pre-
cisely what I want, and inconveniences aside, I feel no regret about this.
Obviously a replacement wouldn’t be just the same, but the question is
whether a replacement would be just as good, and specifically good in the
same way. Joseph Raz makes a similar comment in discussing the role the
uniqueness of objects can play in personal attachments: “There is ðor
wasÞ something about the object which lends it value of a special kind,
such that while some feasible replacements may be as good or even bet-
ter, they will not be quite the same—not quite the same in what makes
6. John O’Neill, Alan Holland, and Andrew Light, Environmental Values ðNew York:
Routledge, 2008Þ, 162. See also Martin, “The Concept of the Irreplaceable.”
7. I use “object” and “thing” here and throughout as general terms for any direct object
of our evaluative attitudes, not simply physical objects. As mentioned, these can include
persons, places, practices, and even other things that don’t start with the letter p.
8. Thus, we are considering a way of valuing things that is warranted by objects whose
value is in fact irreplaceable. One need not value an irreplaceable object in this way, but
it would be inappropriate to value as irreplaceable an object whose value was in fact instan-
tiated in other things. Because of this close relationship between the value of objects and
the way that we value them, it is important to consider these matters in concert.
9. Compare Joseph Raz, Value, Respect, and Attachment ðCambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2001Þ, 28 n. 15.
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them good or valuable, and in the precise way they are or were good or
valuable. It is this sense which is relevant to the understanding of why
ðlogicalÞ uniqueness is sometimes important in attachments.”10 Or com-
pare O’ Neill, Holland, and Light: “I may value this particular hammer
even with its frustratingly loose head, because this hammer was passed
on to me by my father who was given it by his grandfather, who used it
to make this table I sit by now, which I also value for similar reasons
and despite its annoying tendency to wobble. I attach a particular sig-
nificance to these objects, and that significance is a matter of their his-
tory. For that reason, things like this are said to be irreplaceable, and
their loss matters in a way that the loss of other functional objects does
not.”11 These reflections indicate the intuitive truth of the following
principle:
Irreplaceability ðIRÞ: An object is meaningfully irreplaceable if
and only if all candidate substitutes would fail to be valuable in the
same way as the original.
A candidate substitute should be understood as something that might
plausibly be valuable in the same way as the original. Thus, this principle
poses a qualitative question about value and should be distinguished
from a related quantitative question about whether it would be bad or
regrettable as such for a valuable object to be destroyed. For instance, if
we assume that twoWarhol silk screens from the same series are valuable
in precisely the same way, then, other things being equal, it would follow
that you ought to accept one as a substitute for the other, and neither is
strictly speaking irreplaceable. But this is compatible with it being a very
bad thing if one of the Warhols were thrown on the bonfire.
That being said, the qualitative nature of irreplaceability need not
trump any and all quantitative concerns. Indeed, questions about irre-
placeability are distinct from questions about incommensurability and
incomparability.12 For instance, the fact that a given artwork is irreplace-
able does not imply that one would never have reason to sell it, nor does
the fact that one might accept money in exchange for an artwork imply
that art and money are valuable in the same way: two values may be radi-
cally different qualitatively yet still be commensurable on the same scale.13
IRmay provide a pro tanto reason not to accept a candidate substitute pro-
vided that an agent has a special interest in the original ðor some other
reason to value an object that is valuable in that particular wayÞ, but other
10. Ibid., 25–26.
11. O’Neill, Holland, and Light, Environmental Values, 148.
12. For a discussion, see Ruth Chang, ed., Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Prac-
tical Reason ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997Þ, esp. her introduction.
13. Compare Cohen, “Rescuing Conservatism,” 217–18.
38 Ethics October 2013
This content downloaded from 149.130.251.150 on Tue, 1 Oct 2013 07:37:23 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
considerations might provide countervailing reasons.14 Moreover, if two
objects are understood to be incomparable when one is neither better,
nor worse, nor equally good as the other, then this matter too is distinct
from questions of irreplaceability—we can discuss whether two objects
are valuable in the same way without adopting any commitments about
which is better.15
So in cases where an object that is valued for its history appears ir-
replaceable, it seems that the history of the object makes it irreplace-
able by granting it a value that is qualitatively different from a potential
substitute. But as we have noted, a simple appeal to an object’s having a
particular history is insufficient to satisfy IR: a successful account needs
to avoid what we can call “the proliferation problem,” the unacceptable
implication that everything is meaningfully irreplaceable.
In order to explain the phenomenon at hand, we need a better
understanding of the relationship between irreplaceability and the his-
torical mode of valuation, one that will accommodate the diverse things
that we value for their histories, including ðbut not limited toÞ family
heirlooms, mementos, personal relationships, ancient artifacts, artworks,
childhood haunts, historic sites, and natural environments. My argument
will proceed as follows. I first consider a recent attempt by Cohen to ex-
plain the role of irreplaceability in valuing, and I critique the approach
he employs. Next, I consider an important truth in Cohen’s essay, namely,
that objects that seem irreplaceable are valued for what they are, but I
explain how this fact has led a number of philosophers astray in their
discussion of this topic. I emphasize the important point that histori-
cal features only acquire significance in specific evaluative respects, and
thus the relevant values must first be articulated before the significance
of their constituent historical features is clear: it is only then that certain
historical properties can succeed in satisfying IR. The mere facts that an
object is individuated or has a distinct history are alone insufficient to
this task—in the absence of such a justification, we merely harbor an un-
warranted bias in favor of certain things. Finally, reflecting on a plausi-
ble account of how historical significance can satisfy IR reveals that a
focus on the phenomenon of irreplaceability as a defining feature of the
14. One might think that the mere fact that an object is irreplaceable gives one pro
tanto reason to prefer it to a candidate substitute that is not valuable in the same way. But
absent some antecedent reason for valuing the original, this implication does not follow.
After all, it is not contrary to reason to have an object that is irreplaceably valuable, but to in
fact prefer another object that is valuable in a different way, as when, for instance, onehas
an irreplaceably valuable painting but would in fact prefer a different one. Thanks to Sarah
Buss for making this point clear to me.
15. Compare Frank Sibley, “Originality and Value,” in Approach to Aesthetics, ed. John
Benson, Berry Redfern, and Jeremy Roxbee Cox ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2001Þ,
119–34, 122–23. Thanks to Nick Riggle for introducing me to Sibley’s work.
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historical mode of valuation was a false start. There are nonhistorical
ways that an object can satisfy IR without acquiring the special character
of objects that we value for their histories, and historically significant
objects do not always satisfy IR in the way we might expect them to:
hence irreplaceability can be neither necessary nor sufficient for secur-
ing historical value. In the end, I suggest that it is not incidental secur-
ing of irreplaceability, but rather, an otherwise impossible connection
with significant aspects of the past that is truly distinctive of the historical
mode of valuation.
II. COHEN’S THEORY OF “PARTICULAR VALUE”
Cohen’s reflections on his eraser appear in a recent essay in which he
defends an account of value that offers an explanation of the irreplace-
ability sometimes exhibited by valued objects. He casts his approach in
contrast with utilitarianism, maximizing consequentialism, or any other
theory of value according to which “the bearers of value, as opposed to
the value they bear, do not count as such, but matter only because of the
value that they bear, and are therefore, in a deep sense, dispensable.”16
Cohen argues that such theories lack the conceptual resources to make
sense of the way a valued object can be irreplaceable: according to such
theories, any Y that is the bearer of equal or greater value properties as
some X must necessarily be just as good or better. Thus, not only would
it be rational to replace one with the other, but moreover, there could
be no reason for regretting the destruction or loss of X if it could be re-
placed by Y.
To block this implication, Cohen argues that there are “two ways
of valuing something other than as a pure function of the amount or type
of value that resides in it. In the first way of valuing that I have in mind,
a person values something because of the special relation of the thing to
that person. In the second way, a person values something as the partic-
ular valuable thing that it is, and not merely for the value that resides
in it, but not, in this second case, because of her own special relationship
to the thing in question.”17 Cohen’s eraser is an example of the first type,
what he calls “personal valuing.” In this case, Cohen values the eraser just
for its history and his relation to it. In contrast, the second type of valu-
ing, “particular valuing,” does not take into account relational features
of the object, such as its history, but pertains only to its being an existing
bearer of intrinsic value.18 Being the bearer of intrinsic value properties
16. Cohen, “Rescuing Conservatism,” 212.
17. Ibid., 206.
18. For emphasis, see ibid., 206 n. 4: “To be sure, a thing’s being especially valuable
because it is old is not the same as its being especially valuable because it exists.”
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is thus the criterion in virtue of which an object of particular valuing is
supposed to satisfy IR. If Cohen’s account of what makes an object irre-
placeable succeeds ðdespite being partially ahistoricalÞ, it may play a role
in explaining some of the apparently historical cases I am concerned
with in this essay. After all, the things that we value for their histories also
exist, and thus Cohen’s account would include all of these valued things,
even if the explanation of their satisfying IR does not make reference to
their historical features. Moreover, Cohen’s account of particular value
would need to explain those apparently historical cases where the phe-
nomenon of irreplaceability is not necessarily a function of one’s own
relationship to the valued object ðand hence where his account of per-
sonal valuing would not applyÞ, such as artworks, artifacts, historic sites,
and natural environments.
On Cohen’s account, value as a particular is understood as the value
something has qua bearer of value, which is distinguished from the gen-
eral value instantiated in a particular thing. If we imagine an object as
being a vessel for value, then in addition to the general value properties
that the vessel contains, the vessel itself is valuable insofar as it con-
tains those general value properties.19 According to the “conservatism”
that Cohen argues for, we should adopt a justified bias in favor of this
value that particular things have qua bearers of value. He writes: “Con-
servatism is an expensive taste, because conservatives sacrifice value in or-
der not to sacrifice things that have value. We keep the existing partic-
ular valuable things at the expense of not making things in general as
valuable as they could be made to be. Value, one might provocatively say,
is not the only thing that is valuable: so are particular valuable things.
And the two desiderata sometimes need to be traded off against each
other.”20 The value of particulars that Cohen posits is meant to explain
the irreplaceability of valuable objects. By attributing value to the par-
ticular bearers of value, a value that is not itself understood as a further
19. Compare Peter Singer ðPractical Ethics ½Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993, 121Þ, who uses this analogy as well. Tim Chappell, despite making an argument
friendly to Cohen’s, criticizes this kind of picture in “Absolutes and Particulars,” in Modern
Moral Philosophy, ed. Anthony O’Hear ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004Þ,
95–118. I hope that this essay helps explain why a number of the claims Chappell makes in
his essay are mistaken.
20. Cohen, “Rescuing Conservatism,” 212. I think Cohen’s elusive language here be-
lies a lack of clarity regarding what precisely “particular value” is supposed to be, if not a
further value property. As one reviewer notes: “I suppose Cohen wants to say ‘p itself,’ but
surely the particular ‘p’ is distinct from its particular value.” I agree that this is a further
difficulty for Cohen’s view. I imagine that Cohen would claim that we are in the grip of a
certain metaphysical picture, and that he is trying to challenge the very notion that value
must always be a general value property ðhence the provocative claim that value is not the
only thing that is valuableÞ. However, even if we entertain this possibility, the view is still
faced with the objections enumerated in the remainder of this section.
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value property, we, strictly speaking, render particular valuable things
irreplaceable. The value that X has as the particular bearer of value can-
not so much as be replaced or reinstantiated by the value of Y as a par-
ticular bearer of value. Even if X andY share the same general value prop-
erties, they will be, insofar as they are distinct objects, distinctly valuable
qua bearers of value and thus will satisfy IR.
It is important to understand the extent of this thesis. Cohen
writes: “The special claim that I have defended is of the value that ex-
ists, regardless of how long it’s been around. Even if the picture was
painted only five minutes ago, there’s a reason not to destroy it in order
to use its pigment to produce a better one.”21 While this strikes me as
a controversial claim, we should also be careful not to overstate Cohen’s
thesis. He is not saying that it would be wrong to salvage the pigments
from a five-minute-old painting, or even that it shouldn’t be done: the
claim is merely that there is a reason not to do so, and this reason is
tied to the five-minute-old painting’s particular value as a bearer of in-
trinsic value properties. The presence of this reason allows us to explain
why we might be rationally resistant to destroying or replacing it, and
why we might regret the loss of the five-minute-old painting, even if it
would allow us to produce an equally good or better one. The character
of the commitment to the value of particulars is captured well in Co-
hen’s discussion of destroying a building in order to produce a better
one: “A conservative can believe that what rises from the ashes is the
greatest building ever and that it was right to build it, yet still feel dis-
traught that the old building was destroyed.”22
We can thus characterize Cohen’s argument as positing the value
of the particular bearers of value, as distinct from the value properties
that they bear, in order to explain the phenomena of irreplaceability
and regrettable loss that we experience with respect to certain valued
things. In evaluating the strength of this account, we should therefore
be sensitive to whether positing the value of particulars explains all and
only the intuitively reasonable instances of the phenomena to be ex-
plained ðsupplemented, of course, by his account of personal valuingÞ. If
the account fails to fully explain the phenomena or attributes irreplace-
ability or regrettable loss to things that intuitively lack it, these would
be bases for critiquing the account and considering alternative expla-
nations.
A
First, in inquiring whether one X is good in the same way as some Y,
we need to know in what respect it is just as good. The reason my um-
brella is so easily replaceable is that the relevant value is merely instru-
21. Ibid., 213.
22. Ibid.
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mental: I will take any substitute that gets the job done equally well.
Attributing value to the particular bearers of intrinsic value properties
is supposed to block this kind of simple substitution. If Y has particu-
lar value qua bearer of intrinsic value properties, it is necessarily a dif-
ferent value from the particular value that X has qua bearer of intrinsic
value properties. Instances of particular value are, by stipulation, distinct
in roughly the same way that particular objects are distinct.
Why, then, is it only the bearers of intrinsic value properties that
have particular value? Surely, just as we can individuate one umbrella
from another, we can individuate this bearer of instrumental value and
that bearer of instrumental value. If we can identify two distinct bear-
ers of value properties, why should the kind of value properties that
they instantiate be relevant to whether they have value as the particu-
lar bearers of those value properties? The reason seems to be that ob-
jects of merely instrumental value, as noted, are not intuitively irre-
placeable. But that would be an ad hoc basis for limiting the scope of
particular value, given that it is irreplaceability that particular value is
supposed to explain. There does not appear to be a principled reason
to think that something having value as the particular bearer of value
properties should be limited to bearers of intrinsic value beyond the
fact that such an account fits the data. But that should lead us to ques-
tion whether positing particular value explains the data, or if it rather
just begs the question. Cohen’s theory of particular value takes the class
of things that are intuitively irreplaceable and attributes to them an ad-
ditional kind of value that by definition satisfies IR. The worry is that
if we lack a theoretical basis for limiting this value to only the cases that
exhibit the phenomenon to be explained, we will have simply reaffirmed
which are the intuitive cases of irreplaceability and not explained that
evaluative feature at all.
B
As we move beyond concerns about the explanatory role of particular
value, we should be sensitive to whether the account succeeds in pick-
ing out the correct cases. It is often easy to assume that objects of in-
trinsic value are ipso facto special in a way that explains the appear-
ance of irreplaceability. However, it is not clear that this assumption
is warranted. Consider coming across a field full of beautiful flowers.
You would like to take some home for your special someone. But does
it matter which flowers you take? If the flowers are indistinguishable
in their beauty, it seems that any handful of flowers will be as good as
any other.23 Assuming that natural beauty is an intrinsic property of flow-
23. Note that, unlike Raz’s discussion of indistinguishable flowers in “The Little Prince,”
none of these flowers are “tamed”: you have no special relationship with any of them ðRaz,
Value, Respect, and Attachment, chap. 1Þ.
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ers, the fact that each flower is the bearer of intrinsic value properties
does not, intuitively, render it irreplaceable or subject to regrettable
loss. If you picked a bouquet of flowers and a mischievous child stole
them, it does not appear that you would have any reason to regret the
loss ðworries about kids these days asideÞ. You would just reach down
and pick another handful of flowers, the second handful being valu-
able in the same way as the first. While many intrinsically valuable things
are intuitively irreplaceable, it is a mistake to assume that this is a fea-
ture of all intrinsically valuable things, a conclusion that would follow
from the theory of particular value that Cohen espouses.
Because IR is satisfied on Cohen’s account just in virtue of an ob-
ject’s being the bearer of intrinsic value properties, the notion of par-
ticular value moreover guarantees that every distinct object that has
such intrinsic value properties will be irreplaceable. Hence, on Cohen’s
account, two objects that share every conceivable property besides oc-
cupying the same space at the same time will still satisfy IR. For example,
the Warhol silk screens mentioned earlier would not only be irreplace-
able one for the other, but more importantly, it would be impossible
for them not to be irreplaceable in this way. While there is surely a dis-
cussion to be had about whether two such objects are in fact valu-
able in the same way, Cohen’s account precludes even the possibility of
this assessment. It thus leads directly to an instance of the proliferation
problem—every bearer of intrinsic value properties necessarily satisfies
IR.
As mentioned earlier, Cohen often speaks interchangeably about
the substitutability of one object for another, and the destruction of
one object in order to create another. This is another case where we can
see that these two issues come apart. The fact that you would readily
accept one handful of flowers as a replacement for another does not
imply anything about whether it would be a bad thing for some of the
flowers to be destroyed. Irreplaceability per se pertains only to whether X
is valuable in the same way as Y, and what this entails about the justi-
fication of our evaluative behavior: the answers to these questions can
be determined independently of whether or not there is reason not to
destroy X to bring about Y. 24 Moreover, assuming that it is a bad thing
for some beautiful flowers to be destroyed, it is not clear that this de-
pends on their value being intrinsic. It is not obvious that it would be
any less bad for some umbrellas to be destroyed, though I imagine both
cases are rather trivial. However, we know that umbrellas, absent extra-
ordinary circumstances, are not irreplaceable. If it is nevertheless a bad
24. I discuss issues of destruction and preservation at greater length in my disserta-
tion, “Engaging with the Past: Essays on History, Value, and Practical Reason” ðUniversity of
California, Berkeley, 2013Þ.
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thing ðhowever minorÞ for umbrellas to be destroyed, this serves to em-
phasize the conceptual independence of questions about destruction
from questions about irreplaceability.
C
It may be helpful here to follow an influential thread in the value the-
ory literature and note that an object need not be intrinsically valuable
in order to be valued for its own sake or have “final value.”25 Indeed,
insofar as it is the special value of particular things we are trying to ex-
plain, it would be no surprise if these were all things that were val-
ued for their own sakes.26 However, even something that is extrinsically
valuable can be valued for its own sake. Consider Elizabeth Anderson’s
example of Sharon’s ugly bracelet, which is only valued because it was
given to her by a friend. Its value is extrinsic, but she does not value it
instrumentally.27 Or more generally, consider that objects we value for
their histories have extrinsic value: the significance of historical prop-
erties is inherently relational. Nevertheless, we certainly seem to value
historically significant objects, from heirlooms to artifacts, for their own
sakes. However, these objects are not assimilable to Cohen’s theory of
particular value, as they need not be the bearers of intrinsic value prop-
erties. Of course, Cohen can claim that the case of the bracelet or the
heirloom, like the case of his eraser, is captured by his account of per-
sonal value. However, this appeal would not succeed for historically sig-
nificant objects that are not valued for their relation to one’s own his-
tory, such as antiquities or fine artworks. Moreover, if valuing for its own
sake is a better candidate for explaining irreplaceability than intrinsic
value, the distinction between particular valuing and personal valuing
begins to seem artificial: it appears that the irreplaceability of both in-
trinsically and nonintrinsically valuable things has the potential to be cap-
tured by a unified account.
These are, then, at least three reasons to question the explanatory
power of Cohen’s account of particular value, as well as its accuracy in
picking out the correct cases. To review: ðAÞThe relationship between in-
trinsic value and particular value is stipulative and thus explanatorily
25. For discussion, see, e.g., Christine M. Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness,”
Philosophical Review 92 ð1983Þ: 169–95; Rae Langton, “Objective and Unconditioned Value,”
Philosophical Review 116 ð2007Þ: 157–85; Shelly Kagan, “Rethinking Intrinsic Value,” Journal of
Ethics 2 ð1998Þ: 277–97; Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, “A Distinction in
Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 ð2000Þ: 33–51.
26. For further discussion of this point, see Christopher Grau, “Irreplaceability and
Unique Value,” Philosophical Topics 32 ð2004Þ: 111–29.
27. Elizabeth Anderson,Value in Ethics and Economics ðCambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1995Þ, 21–22. Admittedly, it is not clear whether Anderson would claim the
bracelet is valued for its own sake, as I would.
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weak; ðB ÞNot all intrinsically valuable things are irreplaceable; and ðC Þ Ex-
trinsically valuable things can be irreplaceable, and indeed, some are par-
adigms of irreplaceability. Given these problems for the proposal, we can,
bearing them in mind, return to exploring irreplaceability in historical
terms to see if we can arrive at an account that fares better. The failure of
Cohen’s ahistorical account of particular value is at least an initial piece
of evidence that irreplaceability is, consonant with the diverse examples
surveyed at the outset and contrary to my thesis, indeed a distinctive
feature of objects that we value for their histories.
III. VALUING AN OBJECT FOR WHAT IT IS
A helpful notion that emerges from Cohen’s thoughts on particular
value is the sense in which irreplaceability is largely concerned with what
a particular valuable object is. He writes: “Just as you may love somebody
because of who and what they are, rather than just for the value of what
they produce and for the value of what they instantiate, so you may love
a loveable institution because it is the institution that it is and it possesses
the character that it has. So if you seek to set the agenda for an insti-
tution, you must ask not only what its goals are and should be, and how
it may best achieve them, but also what it, the institution, is.”28
This idea presents a perennial problem in the theory of love: do
we love or value persons just for their properties or qualities, or can we
make sense of loving persons as the particular individuals they are, apart
from the qualities they have?29 A familiar concern with the latter attempt
is that it seems to place love outside the realm of reasons, in conflict with
our intuitive sense that love can be responsive to normative considera-
tions.30 As Niko Kolodny puts it: “The beloved’s bare identity, however,
cannot serve as a reason for loving her. To say ‘She is Jane’ is simply to
identify a particular with itself. It is to say nothing about that particular
that might explain why a specific response to it is called for.”31 Kolodny
notes that he is relying on an assumption here, namely, “that giving a
reason to respond to some particular in a distinctive way necessarily in-
28. Cohen, “Rescuing Conservatism,” 207.
29. This problem is discussed in, e.g., Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship”;
J. David Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion,” Ethics 109 ð1999Þ: 338–74; Kenneth Henley,
“The Value of Individuals,”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 ð1977Þ: 345–52; Grau,
“Irreplaceability and Unique Value”; Christopher Grau, “Love and History,” Southern Jour-
nal of Philosophy 48 ð2010Þ: 246–71; Chappell, “Absolutes and Particulars”; Richard Kraut,
“Love De Re,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 ð1987Þ: 413–30; A. O. Rorty, “The Historicity
of Psychological Attitudes: Love Is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds,”
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 ð1987Þ: 399–412.
30. As Henley puts it, “Characteristics which necessarily individuate also necessarily
offer us no grounds for valuing” ð“The Value of Individuals,” 345Þ.
31. Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 142.
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volves predicating some general feature of that particular.”32 While it is
possible to question this assumption, an alternative account would be
contrary to prevailing views about the way reasons work. For our pur-
poses, it is sufficient to note that any alternative view would have a diffi-
cult time explaining why a given thing’s being the particular one that it is
makes it irreplaceable, as opposed to some other particular thing. Be-
cause the alternative view rejects the requirement that reasons general-
ize, it need not accept the implication that any object’s being the par-
ticular one that it is makes it irreplaceable, and thus need not lead to the
proliferation problem. However, this demonstrates just how radical this
view is: its proponent can consistently claim that one object’s being the
particular thing that it is provides reason to value it as irreplaceable
without claiming this is true of any other object. This is a substantial
explanatory weakness.33
Moreover, the proponent of the standard view that reasons neces-
sarily generalize has a ready diagnosis of the problem with the alterna-
tive kind of account. The mistake here seems to be conflating the fact
that a particular object is valued for some set of properties with the
notion that it is therefore those properties that are valued and not the
particular object itself. As many have noted in the literature on love, a
distinction can be made between the object or focus of valuation and
the basis for valuing it so.34 The fact that certain properties provide the
basis for valuing a particular object does not entail that that object is
not the focus of valuation.35 A fortiori, whether or not the characteristics
32. Ibid., 185 n. 14. This assumption seems to be shared by those who favor an ac-
count of love that goes beyond properties or qualities, though they generally find the im-
plication of love lacking justification in terms of reasons unproblematic.
33. Thanks to a reviewer for helping me clarify this point. However, as explained
above, this is a problem for Cohen’s specific view, as he does make the general claim that
any bearer of intrinsic value properties has particular value qua bearer of those properties.
It seems that any view that attempted to make a general claim of this type would also lead to
the proliferation problem.
34. See Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 154; Velleman, “Love as a Moral
Emotion,” 368; Grau, “Love and History,” 260. See also Anderson, Value in Ethics and Eco-
nomics, 19.
35. Here are a few examples of a refusal to grant this distinction. Chappell writes of
a “Lockean” finding himself in the following dilemma: “Either I love you for some reason,
or I love you for no reason. If I love you for no reason, then obviously my love is unrea-
sonable. If I love you for some reason, then my reason for loving you must cite some prop-
erty that you have. But then what I love is not you, but that property. It follows that loving
a person ‘for himself’ is either impossible or unreasonable” ðChappell, “Absolutes and Par-
ticulars,” 97Þ. Kraut, anticipating the object/basis distinction, writes: “Emotions with the same
intentional focus can surely be based upon quite different reasons. For example, Walter’s
reason for loving Sandra is that she has remarkable musical ability, whereas Karl’s reason for
loving Sandra is that she is a superb conversationalist. Aren’t their attitude nonetheless di-
rected toward the same object?” But Kraut immediately rejects this analysis: “On some course-
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that provide the basis for valuing an object are instantiated in one object
or many should not have any effect on the focus of valuation.
Consider that there is no puzzle about individuating the objects
of valuation when they are simply instantiating value of a general type.
For instance, say I’m about to head out into the rain, and I value this
umbrella here for keeping the rain off my head. The reasons I have for
valuing the umbrella are perfectly general instrumental ones: there are
lots of other objects that could serve the same function. But that doesn’t
make it puzzling that I value this umbrella for that general reason. Surely,
I don’t value it “as a particular” in any honorific sense: it is certainly not
irreplaceable. However, the fact that the umbrella is just instrumentally
valuable does not make it the case that this umbrella is not the focus of
valuation. I am valuing this instantiation of a certain instrumental value;
if we were to swap umbrellas, then I would value that instantiation of the
same value. Those philosophers dissatisfied with the idea of valuing a
particular thing in virtue of its general features are seduced by the ex-
pectation that the properties that individuate the object must also ex-
plain the way in which it is valued. However, this is manifestly not the case,
as is clear when we consider examples of instrumental value: being val-
ued “as the object that it is” is really just a redundant assertion of the fo-
cus of valuation.36 This umbrella is valued as the object that it is, namely,
an object that has instrumental value ðhow else would you value it, as
an object that it’s not?Þ. If this is the case, then understanding the value
of an object “as the object that it is” is not a matter of the features that
necessarily individuate the object of valuation being the basis for valu-
ing it, but rather, concerns individuating the basis for valuing one ob-
ject from the basis for valuing another. I have a room full of umbrellas,
they are all individuated objects, but the basis for valuing each object is
the same: each one is valuable in the same way as the other. What would
make one of those umbrellas irreplaceable would be features that pro-
vided a basis for valuing it in a different way from the other umbrellas
ðor anything elseÞ, such that nothing would be good in the same way—
only then would it satisfy IR.
36. Notice that this is still the case if we say “because it is the object that it is” or “for the
reason that it is the object that it is.” The point is that “being the object that it is” is just a
claim about the focus of valuation that does not yet say anything about what makes that
object valuable.
grained level of description, this is obviously right. But strictly speaking, Walter’s attitude is
directed toward Sandra’s musicianship; Karl’s attitude is directed toward her conversational
skills. These are distinct objects indeed.” He goes on to claim that “the sense in which their
attitudes are directed ‘toward the same object’ is a loose and popular sense. A more rigorous,
fine-grained characterization of the intentional object of the love discloses a genuine dispar-
ity of content, generated by the disparity in reasons. The reasons for the love constitute the
intentional focus of the love.” Kraut, “Love De Re,” 417–18.
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Thus, we need a way of identifying the evaluative significance of
what an object is, without employing the empty move of identifying it
with itself. A common way to achieve this is by appealing to the origin
or history of the object. So, for instance, O’Neill, Holland, and Light
write: “We distinguished between goods that we value in virtue of their
displaying a particular cluster of properties, such as functional goods,
and goods that we value not merely as displaying a cluster of proper-
ties but as particular individuals individuated by a temporal history
and spatial location. . . . There is no substitute for these ½latter goods
since their value resides in their particular history.”37 At first, they seem
to be making the same claim as Cohen and others: that some things
are valued not for their properties but as the individuals that they are.
However, they then specify that their value as individuals “resides in
their particular history.” But, claims to the contrary notwithstanding,
historical properties are still properties, and thus this proposal is an im-
portant shift away from Cohen’s claim that individuals themselves have
some sort of special value as the bearer of value properties. All the same,
we need to do more than simply appeal to the fact that a given thing has
a distinct history if we are to avoid the same problems with empty iden-
tity statements and proliferation of irreplaceability discussed above. What
we need to consider is the evaluative significance of historical properties.
If the evaluative significance of historical properties can account for the
intuitive cases of irreplaceability without positing a distinct and problem-
atic “value of particulars,” then we will succeed in both justifying many of
the intuitive cases and avoiding the proliferation problem.
IV. HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND IRREPLACEABILITY
The historical origin of an object is what Denis Dutton calls, in the
context of artworks, the object’s nominal authenticity ðthis is contrasted
with expressive authenticity, the “object’s character as a true expression of an
individual’s or a society’s values and beliefs”Þ.38 As Dutton notes, however,
whether or not something is authentic in the nominal sense depends on
the respect in which it is being assessed: while a Van Meegeren is not an
authentic Vermeer, it is, of course, an authentic Van Meegeren.39 Thus,
the concept of nominal authenticity links up with the need to articulate
a relevant respect or aspect of evaluative assessment when determining
whether a given X is irreplaceable. As Raz puts it: “Irreplaceability is of
course, aspect dependent. Every thing is irreplaceable in some respects
37. O’Neill, Holland, and Light, Environmental Values, 198–99.
38. Denis Dutton, “Authenticity in Art,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, ed. Jer-
rold Levinson ðNew York: Oxford University Press, 2003Þ.
39. Ibid.
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and replaceable in others.”40 In order to know whether matters of nom-
inal authenticity have evaluative relevance, we first need to establish the
relevant evaluative respect. The fact that a given Van Meegeren is an in-
authentic Vermeer only has evaluative relevance if we are assessing the
value of the painting qua Vermeer. Absent this evaluative parameter, not-
ing that the Van Meegeren is an inauthentic Vermeer is akin to noting
that a painted horse is an inauthentic zebra: it is true that they are dif-
ferent animals, but independent of a specified evaluative respect, it is
unclear why this fact should matter.
So, it is only once we know the evaluative respect in which we are
assessing the object that the question of what it is becomes evaluatively
relevant, and only then that we can assess whether it is different from
others or unique in an evaluatively relevant way. The historical proper-
ties that can serve to establish what an object is or to differentiate it
from another do not, on their own, have evaluative or normative im-
plications. This should remind us of Arthur Danto’s claim that “a par-
ticular thing or occurrence acquires historical significance in virtue of
its relations to some other thing or occurrence in which we happen to
have some special interest, or to which we attach some importance, for
whatever reason.”41 It is a given context of evaluative assessment that
renders certain historical features significant, and this is no less true
when considering the historical features of an object that supposedly
render it unique. Along these lines in the context of artwork, Jack Mei-
land writes: “Far from originality adding to the aesthetic value of a work
ðas distinct from adding to the total value of the workÞ, the originality
value depends upon that work first being valuable in other ways. No one
cares about an original work of art that is a very bad work. Its original-
ity matters only when it is very good.”42 Or on this same theme, Shelly
Kagan writes: “One need not hold that anything at all becomes intrin-
sically valuable as it becomes rare or unique. It might be, for example,
that only objects that are independently intrinsically valuable are such
as to have their value enhanced by uniqueness.”43 That one thing is
unlike another is only evaluatively significant when it is unlike another
in a valuable way—likewise, that one thing has a different history from
another is only evaluatively relevant if the historical difference is a sig-
nificant one.
40. Raz, Value, Respect, and Attachment, 25.
41. Arthur C. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History ðCambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1965Þ, 167.
42. Jack W. Meiland, “Originals, Copies, and Aesthetic Value,” in The Forger’s Art: Forg-
ery and the Philosophy of Art, ed. Denis Dutton ðBerkeley: University of California Press, 1983Þ,
115–30, 123.
43. Kagan, “Rethinking Intrinsic Value,” 283. See also Sibley, “Originality and Value.”
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It should not be surprising, then, that different evaluative respects
will select for the significance of historical features in different ways, but
in each case, it is establishing the nature of the value in question that
determines the relevance and significance of its historical features. In the
context of artworks, for instance, few affirm that the nominal authentic-
ity of a work is irrelevant to all evaluative assessments; rather, discussion
revolves around whether or not historical features are specifically rele-
vant to the aesthetic value of the artwork.44 Thus, those who endorse an
“appearance-based” view of aesthetics, or a thoroughgoing formalist un-
derstanding, will naturally deny the relevance of nominal authenticity to
aesthetic value: after all, you cannot see the historical features of a paint-
ing. In response, critics can, for instance, either offer a more capacious
aesthetic theory or argue that authenticity is in fact relevant to how we
look at artworks, even if there are at the moment no readily discernible
differences between originals and forgeries.45 Indeed, purely formalist
aestheticians are hard to find these days. This is no place for an inquiry
into the nature of aesthetic value: the point is simply that this is the task
required for an assessment of the evaluative relevance of historical fea-
tures to works of art and other objects of aesthetic inquiry.
For a different kind of case, one involving reference to one’s own
history, consider personal relationships. Take Kolodny’s relationship-
based account of love. Why is a history of shared activity and concern
identified as a reason for the psychological state of love? We first identify
the kind of case that is paradigmatic of the evaluative class we have in
mind, and it is as a result of determining the relevant value that histori-
cal features are deemed significant. Consider in this light the following
claim by Kolodny: “What, in normal cases, causally sustains this concern
½constitutive of love is a good guide to the normative reasons for it. In
general, the contents of the beliefs that normally sustain an emotion also
serve as normative reasons for it. The history of an established relation-
ship with a person, and the fact that she continues to reciprocate one’s
feelings, in turn constitute a normative reason for one’s present emo-
44. See, e.g., Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols ðIn-
dianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968Þ, sec. 3; Meiland, “Originals, Copies, and Aesthetic Value”;
William Bossart, “Authenticity and Aesthetic Value in the Visual Arts,” British Journal of Aes-
thetics 1 ð1961Þ: 144–59; Mark Sagoff, “On Restoring and Reproducing Art,” Journal of Philos-
ophy 75 ð1978Þ: 453–70, “The Aesthetic Status of Forgeries,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism 35 ð1976Þ: 169–80, and “Historical Authenticity,” Erkenntnis 12 ð1978Þ: 83–93.
45. See work by Mark Sagoff and Nelson Goodman, respectively. For an expansive
approach similar to Goodman’s, see Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects, 2nd ed. ðCam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980Þ. For further reflections on this puzzle and a
critique of Goodman’s analysis, see, respectively Robert Hopkins, “Painting, History, and
Experience,” Philosophical Studies 127 ð2006Þ: 19–35, and “Aesthetics, Experience, and Dis-
crimination,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 ð2005Þ: 119–33.
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tional vulnerability.”46 What we find, then, is that historical features
are not merely relevant to the uninformative claim that some X is the
particular X that it is, but importantly, historical features can be relevant
to some X qualifying as an instance of a valuable type: having a certain
history of interactions with another person is constitutive of a certain
valuable relationship, but we first need to identify this evaluative class
before we can assess the relevance of some set of historical features to
it.Wehave yet to explain, however, the specific role that historical features
play on this account in making a given X that is a member of a valuable
type satisfy IR.
What is interesting about historical features is that when they have
evaluative relevance, they can play a role in picking out particular val-
uable things akin to the role that they play in picking out particular ob-
jects in nonevaluative contexts. Value that is partially constituted by a
certain history can only be instantiated in an object that has the relevant
history. If being a Vermeer has aesthetic value that is constituted in part
by its having been painted by Vermeer, then it is immediately clear why
paintings that are not nominally authentic Vermeers fail to have the same
kind of aesthetic value that the Vermeer has. Likewise, a family heirloom,
the value of which is constituted by its history, has a value that cannot be
shared by a qualitative duplicate that lacks the right historical features.
Because of the natural uniqueness of historical properties, they are well
suited to satisfying IR in cases where a given set of historical properties
is uniquely constitutive of the value in question. This is the feature of his-
torical properties that John Martin appeals to when he writes of things
we value for their histories: “Their historical properties are so specific
that they admit of no substitutes.”47 However, this need not be the case
evaluatively speaking. If distinctions in value are recognized to be coarser-
grained than distinctions in objects—and distinctions in historical sig-
nificance likewise coarser-grained than distinctions in historical proper-
ties—we will not consequently end up with a problematic proliferation of
uniquely valuable things.
We can imagine a person who suffers from a failure to see this dif-
ference.48 Consider a person who believes that every object with which
he has interacted acquires a special historical significance that renders
it worthy of being cherished. It is not enough for him to save a repre-
sentative memento, but every associated item becomes a relic. Surely, we
46. Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 162.
47. Martin, “The Concept of the Irreplaceable,” 42.
48. The reader will no doubt notice a resemblance between the example I construct
here and a person engaged in hoarding behavior. This is originally what I had in mind, but
a reviewer helpfully reminded me that hoarding is a real pathology. I do not pretend to be
offering an etiology of that illness, but I imagine a person committing the evaluative
mistake I consider here would be engaged in similar behavior.
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would take this behavior to rest on an evaluative mistake. If there’s any-
thing valuable about the bulk of the things that this character saves,
they are no doubt all valuable in the same way. He mistakes distinctions
among objects for distinctions in value.
Once we recognize the danger of this mistake, it is easier to see how
various objects might have the same historical significance despite not
sharing identical historical properties. If the value of some family heir-
looms consists in their having belonged to your great-grandmother,
for instance, then it may be that all of those heirlooms will have the
same historical significance in virtue of sharing that historical feature,
although there are many other such features that they do not share.
Likewise, similar artifacts from similar sites and times might all be histor-
ically significant in the same way. And objects produced in serial ðcoins,
etchings, woodcuts, etc.Þ are all plausible candidates for sharing the
same historical significance despite differences in other historical prop-
erties. Even organisms belonging to the same species or other taxon,
whose value might consist partially in instantiating a swath of evolution-
ary history, could be said to be valuable in the same way ðat least with
respect to their historical significanceÞ.49 But if various objects are his-
torically significant in the same way, then they do not satisfy IR and are
not, as it turns out, irreplaceable. However, the fact that an ancient coin,
or a prehistoric artifact, or a family heirloom fails to satisfy IR ðbecause
there are in fact other objects that are valuable in the same wayÞ does not
alter their status as paradigms of objects we value for their histories. Ir-
replaceability, then, does not seem to be a necessary condition of histori-
cal value.
One might reply that although there are historically significant ob-
jects that do not strictly speaking satisfy IR, many objects that are not
49. Applying these thoughts on irreplaceability to the value of organisms considered
with respect to their evolutionary history could have interesting implications for conserva-
tion biology that tell against exclusive reliance on the species concept. For instance, there
might be a scenario in which species E has a long-branch monophyletic lineage, whereas
species B through K have short-branch lineages that share a common ancestor, and we are
faced with saving either A, or B through E, but not both. An approach to conservation
biology focused on maximizing the preservation of species would favor saving B through E .
However, because of its long-branch lineage, there is a strong sense in which species A is
more unique than any of species B through E, which all have a similar evolutionary history
shared with each other as well as with species F through K. This might ground an evaluative
judgment that would favor preserving species A over preserving species B through E . In-
stead of maximizing the number of preserved species, we would be maximizing the number
of distinctive lineages. Thanks to Brent Mishler for discussion of this topic. For further
discussion, see B. D. Mishler, “Plant Systematics and Conservation: Science and Society,”
Madron˜o 42 ð1995Þ: 103–13, esp. fig. 2, and “Species Are Not Uniquely Real Biological En-
tities,” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology, ed. F. Ayala and R. Arp ðWest Sussex:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010Þ, 110–22.
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meaningfully irreplaceable still can be said to resist replacement. In or-
der to evaluate this proposal and to help clarify the nature of replace-
ability, consider the following principle:
Resistance to Replacement ðRRÞ: An object rationally resists re-
placement if and only if there is a candidate substitute that would
fail to be valuable in the same way as the original.
RR is much weaker than IR. An object satisfies IR when all candidate
substitutes would fail to be valuable in the same way as the original. In
contrast, an object satisfies RR when merely some candidate substitute
would not be valuable in the same way as the original. Recall that can-
didate substitutes are those that might plausibly be valuable in the same
way as the original: this prevents RR from being unhelpfully weak.50 A
hawk is not a candidate substitute for a handsaw, and so the fact that
they are not valuable in the same way hardly warrants mention. How-
ever, the evaluative respect in which we are assessing an object will affect
what other objects qualify as plausible substitutes and hence the size of
the set of candidates with which the original might resist replacement.
This allows us to employ RR to explain how objects can be more or less
resistant to replacement, depending on the pool of acceptable substi-
tutes. Additionally, we could ask how evaluatively different a candidate
substitute is from the original, providing another dimension along which
we could assess the extent of an object’s resistance to replacement.
Consider in this light an example of Kraut’s:
Linus appears to love his security blanket—the particular one he
always clutches. . . . So we ask: Is his love for the blanket historical?
First ask whether the blanket is replaceable. Take it away and watch
the results. Linus mourns and laments and accepts no substitutes—
in fact, he is repulsed by any available successor blanket. It looks
as though the particular blanket we removed was indeed irreplace-
able, was itself the object of his love. But time heals all wounds and
complicates the situation: after two days he calms down; after three
days he is more receptive to alternatives; after four days he is bonded
to a new blanket. It now looks as though the first blanket was not ir-
replaceable after all.51
50. It should also be noted that a viable candidate substitute might not exist yet but
come into existence later. In such a case, the degree to which an object resists replacement
might vary over time, depending on the existence of candidate substitutes and the ease
and predictability with which substitutes can be brought into existence. This also highlights
a complex role played by the availability of substitutes. It may be that there is a perfect eval-
uative substitute for a given object, but you don’t know about it, and moreover it’s buried in
the Himalayas. In this case, the object might not technically satisfy IR, but the conditions
might be such that valuing the object as irreplaceable is pragmatically warranted.
51. Kraut, “Love De Re,” 428.
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Whether or not the blanket, or any object, counts as irreplaceable
will depend, as Kraut notes, on two general parameters: the substitution
class and the criteria for replaceability.52 We can think of criteria for
replaceability as specifications of ways of being valuable, and a substi-
tution class as an ostensive evaluative category defined relative to such a
specification. So, for instance, if the relevant criterion of replaceability
for a blanket is a certain degree of softness, then the correlative substi-
tution class will consist of all the blankets that satisfy this criterion. This
need not imply that all the blankets in that substitution class are gener-
ally interchangeable, but only that they are interchangeable qua blan-
kets of a certain softness. Thus, whether or not one has reason to accept
a replacement will, as I have already claimed, depend on arguing for
a specific individuation in ways of being valuable. An object will satisfy
IR and qualify as meaningfully irreplaceable if the fully specified crite-
ria of replaceability are in fact such that no other object is or could be
valuable in the same way—in other words, the object is the sole member
of its substitution class. But, even if Linus’s blanket fails to satisfy IR
and is hence not meaningfully irreplaceable, it can still satisfy RR. If
there are few acceptable substitutes for the original blanket, or the can-
didate substitutes are quite evaluatively distinct from the original, we can
say that despite not being irreplaceable, it is significantly resistant to re-
placement.
As noted, we should be careful not to mistake the attribution of
an evaluative category for an implication that all of the objects in it are
necessarily interchangeable. For instance, the fact that we might dis-
cuss aesthetic value, or gustatory value, or instrumental value does not
imply that all paintings, or meals, or tools are valuable in the same way
as the other objects in their general evaluative class. A person who be-
lieved that all art objects were valuable in the same way would be a par-
ticularly undiscerning valuer. However, there are many cases in which
the objects within an evaluative class are interchangeable, and we value
a given object merely as an instance of that broader class. For example,
a desire for authentic crafts ðof at least a general expressive kind of au-
thenticity, if not a nominal oneÞ is currently driving home-furnishing
markets. But if the relevant evaluative class is too broad, for instance of
simply being “a quirky apparently handmade craft,” it is easy to see why
such items would not be irreplaceable. A malaise associated with this
fact is captured in a recent New York Times article, “All That Authentic-
ity May Be Getting Old.” As the author writes: “How much authentic-
ity is too much? It’s an oddly philosophical question, given the subject
matter, but one that might occur to anyone confronted with the deluge
of vintage and artisanal products now available online and throughmass-
52. Ibid. Though it should be noted that my definitions of these useful terms diverge
somewhat from Kraut’s.
Matthes History, Value, and Irreplaceability 55
This content downloaded from 149.130.251.150 on Tue, 1 Oct 2013 07:37:23 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
market retailers.”53 The reason all that authenticity is getting old is be-
cause the relevant evaluative class is such that the objects in it are eval-
uatively interchangeable.
Moreover, we should not allow the Linus case to mislead us into
thinking that satisfying the stricter requirement of IR is a matter of
adopting a particularly implacable attitude toward certain valuable ob-
jects. We should thus be mindful of when the attitudes involved in
deeming an object irreplaceable are taken to troubling extremes. For
instance, Sir Harold Nicholson writes:
I should assuredly be prepared to be shot against a wall if I were
certain that by such a sacrifice I could preserve the Giotto frescoes;
nor should I hesitate for an instant ðwhere such a decision ever
open to meÞ to save St. Mark’s even if I were aware that by so doing
I should bring death to my sons. . . . My attitude would be governed
by a principle which is surely incontrovertible. The irreplaceable is
more important than the replaceable, and the loss of even the most
valued human life is ultimately less disastrous than the loss of some-
thing which in no circumstances can ever be created again.54
It is difficult to decide what is more distasteful about this statement: the
cavalier assertion of the commensurability of his sons’ lives with the value
of St. Mark’s, or the more general implication that human lives are “re-
placeable.” It should in any event be a cautionary tale about the attitudes
that are possible where questions of irreplaceability are concerned. In-
deed, because our attitudes can vary in this way, we should be sensitive to
how these attitudes respond to the relevant loss. Do our attitudes appro-
priately track the strength of the reasons we have for believing that an ob-
ject is irreplaceable? This is part of the task of reflecting on and justify-
ing the distinctiveness of the valued things in question. In a fascinating
and disturbing paper, Dan Moller details how, despite our antecedent
commitments to the irreplaceability of our life partners, we are shock-
ingly resilient to their loss and tend to remarry quickly.55 These data de-
mand that we consider whether our attitudes have become corrupted
and are insufficiently responsive to the strength of the reasons we have
for resisting the replacement of our loved ones, or whether our life part-
ners are not in fact as irreplaceable as they seemed.56
53. Emily Weinstein, “All That Authenticity May Be Getting Old,” New York Times,
October 26, 2011.
54. SirHaroldNicholson, “Marginal Comments,”Spectator, February 5, 1944, as quoted
in John Henry Merryman, “Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property,” American Jour-
nal of International Law 80 ð1986Þ: 831–53.
55. Dan Moller, “Love and Death,” Journal of Philosophy 104 ð2007Þ: 301–16.
56. This issue is particularly complicated due to the divergence between our attitudes
before and after the deaths of loved ones. See ibid. I believe that a person can have good
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This is not to assume that irreplaceability consists solely in what
a person is willing or unwilling to accept as a substitute: after all, one
might obstinately fail to accept substitutes for anything, and the rake who
treats romantic partners as interchangeable is a familiar enough charac-
ter. Rather, what we want to assess is whether someone has reason to ac-
cept a replacement. It is natural to think that valuing something as ir-
replaceable is evidence that it is indeed distinctive in this way, but this
is only true if the object actually warrants such evaluative attitudes. The
fact that we regard a given thing as irreplaceable requires that we dem-
onstrate that it is worth regarding this way: otherwise, we merely har-
bor an unjustified bias.
Now, while RR grants us the resources to explain how an object
can resist replacement even when it is not irreplaceable, it should be
clear from the examples employed so far that RR does not bear any
interesting relationship to historical value. Once we specify an evaluative
respect in which we are assessing an object, we create criteria for re-
placeability and a substitution class that can be used to determine resis-
tance to replacement, and these criteria can be completely ahistorical,
as when we assess a blanket with respect to its softness. So RR cannot be
sufficient to secure historical value, and it is only necessary to the extent
that it is a necessary feature of evaluation generally, not because it picks
out a distinctive feature of historical value.
It is natural, however, to think that RR still provides useful guid-
ance for the question at hand provided the evaluative properties we are
assessing are suitably restricted. Our concern in the historical cases seems
to be with the maximally differentiable evaluative features of an object:
not the attribution of criteria for replaceability that define a broad eval-
uative class, but the most specific features that provide a basis for differ-
entiating its value from that of other objects. Hence, what we need is a
narrower construal of resistance to replacement, such as:
Maximal Resistance to Replacement ðMRÞ: An object rationally
resists replacement to a maximal extent when there is a candidate
substitute that would fail to be valuable in the same maximally dif-
ferentiable way as the original.57
57. It should be noted that there might be cases in which friction arises between
differences in ways of being valuable that are discernible and those that are in fact dis-
cerned by a given individual. For instance, there may be important distinctions in ways of
being valuable that are discernible by a practiced art critic but which are indiscernible to
reason to develop a new relationship after the death of a loved one without that implying
that the deceased has been “replaced,” but the topic is effective in raising the question at
hand. Moreover, you might think there is a sense in which we accept a new partner “as a
replacement,” just as Linus eventually accepts a new blanket “as a replacement,” but this
would not be a replacement in the technical sense of an evaluative duplicate.
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MR would allow us to exclude the more general forms of resistance to
replacement exhibited by membership in broad evaluative classes from
the narrower phenomenon that we seem to experience with respect to
objects that we value for their histories. So for instance, qua painting,
a Caravaggio would resist replacement ðRRÞ with a Bernini sculpture
ðthough not qua artworkÞ, but not with paintings by Seurat or Van Eyck.
But once we employ MR, we no longer assess the Caravaggio qua paint-
ing and hence as interchangeable with other members of the substitu-
tion class of paintings, but qua maximally differentiable way of being
valuable, which will ostensibly make reference to the artist and the spe-
cific achievements of the work in question. We could then plausibly say
that it resists replacement with most other paintings, perhaps even all of
them. If all, then in this case, satisfaction of MR would entail satisfaction
of IR.
However, it is important to observe that satisfaction of MR does
not necessarily entail satisfaction of IR. Take an example of Christo-
pher Grau’s: “Consider the set of guitars owned by Jimi Hendrix. One
might care about a particular guitar ðthe one played at Woodstock, for
exampleÞ but then again one might not. One might instead value the
entire set of guitars he played, and freely accept a substitute of one gui-
tar for another. ðThis is a case where history matters, but several objects
share the relevant history.Þ”58 If the maximally differentiable value that
can be justified in this context is “a guitar played by Hendrix,” then one
would have no reason to refuse a substitute of one guitar for another
among the set of guitars that Hendrix played—a Hendrix guitar would
resist replacement with other non-Hendrix guitars, but it would not
satisfy IR. If, on the other hand, the maximally differentiable value that
me. It may thus be justifiable for me to accept a de la Tour in replacement for a Caravaggio,
much to the chagrin of the art critic, if, as far as I am concerned, they are valuable in the
same way. I may be missing something about the comparative qualities of their value, but
my decision would at least make sense given my own evaluative abilities. Of course, we
should be wary of individuals claiming expertise in the discernment of evaluative qualities
if they are incapable of explaining what the difference consists in: I am philosophically
optimistic in believing that it should be possible to articulate what makes something valu-
able. If not, the prospects for much of evaluative inquiry appear bleak. Moreover, though,
it need not be the case that evaluative differences need to be discernible, strictly speaking.
For a discussion, see Hopkins, “Aesthetics, Experience, and Discrimination.”
58. Grau, “Irreplaceability and Unique Value,” 125. Andy Warhol provides an amus-
ing and perceptive anecdote that illustrates this concept: “What’s great about this country
is that America started the tradition where the richest consumers buy essentially the same
things as the poorest. You can be watching TV and see Coca-Cola, and you can know that
the President drinks Coke, Liz Taylor drinks Coke, and just think, you can drink Coke, too.
A Coke is a Coke and no amount of money can get you a better Coke than the one the
bum on the corner is drinking. All the Cokes are the same and all the Cokes are good” ðThe
Philosophy of Andy Warhol: From A to B and Back Again ½New York: Harcourt, 1975, 100–101Þ.
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can be justified is “a guitar played by Hendrix at Woodstock,” and more-
over ðlet’s assumeÞ there is only one such guitar, then in this case satis-
faction of MR would entail satisfaction of IR. The guitar would occupy
a substitution class unto itself.
We now have fairly subtle resources ðIR, MR, RRÞ for explaining the
degree to which a given object might resist replacement, even to the
extent of being irreplaceable. But these resources should make it easier
to see that no form of resistance to replacement tracks the historical
mode of valuation. We have already seen that RR can be satisfied by
any evaluative assessment—indeed, it is in the nature of evaluation to
make distinctions that will trigger RR, and hence it cannot be unique to
historical cases. Thus, satisfying RR may be a necessary condition for his-
torical value, but only insofar as it is a necessary feature of evaluative pred-
ications generally: RR is certainly not sufficient for historical value. MR
provides an intermediate principle between RR and IR that we might
hope would be characteristic of historical cases. However, the output of
MR will simply vary with the case, rather than certain cases characteristi-
cally triggering MR. For instance, umbrellas qua tools would be replace-
able ðRRÞ with other tools, but umbrellas can trigger MR as well: the max-
imally differentiable value of an umbrella just is the instrumental value
of keeping rain off one’s head. Thus, MR allows us to specify the finest
grained distinction in ways of being valuable that can be made in a given
case, but we can employ it in any evaluative context, even in the case of
umbrellas. It may be that application of MR in historical cases will tend
to result in smaller substitution classes, or even in satisfaction of IR, but
this need not be the case, nor would such a phenomenon be unique to
historical cases. Thus, it is likewise not sufficient for historical value.
To press the issue further, imagine a possible world in which
medium-sized physical objects spontaneously undergo mitosis. You’re
admiring a family heirloom, and suddenly you’re holding two of your
grandfather’s rings instead of one. These aren’t just qualitative dupli-
cates—they’re historical duplicates as well. You have no possible basis for
differentiating their values, and they are therefore substitutable for each
other—they don’t satisfy MR with respect to each other. Now imagine
the rings continuing to multiply. We can artificially expand the substi-
tution class as much as we like: the number of available substitutes does
not seem to track the way in which we value the ring for its history.
We can see further evidence for this conclusion if we vary the sub-
stitution class and criteria for replaceability of objects that we mani-
festly do not value for their histories. Return to our trusty, instrumen-
tally valuable umbrella. If there were only one umbrella left in the world
and no more could be produced, that umbrella would be an exemplar
of irreplaceability: it would be the only thing valuable in precisely the
same instrumental way that umbrellas are. It satisfies MR, assuming that
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the instrumental value of the umbrella is indeed our maximally differ-
entiable assessment of its value, and, because no suitable substitute can
exist, it would also satisfy IR. However, provided we don’t view that um-
brella as some kind of memorial to umbrellas past, the fact that it satis-
fies MR and IR doesn’t seem to change the way we would value it, and
it doesn’t seem to render it similar to the way that we value objects be-
cause of their histories. It is still just a tool, albeit the last tool of its kind.
Its overall value might be enhanced by its rarity, but the value in virtue of
which its rarity would matter ðif it wouldÞ would be instrumental. For
another example, consider a key. Being unique is just what the instru-
mental value of a key consists in. It is certainly a good thing about keys
that they can be unique, but even if we had a key that could not be copied,
its satisfying IR would not intuitively make it valuable in the manner of
theHendrix guitars, or themitotic rings, or any other object that we value
for its history, irrespective of the number of replacements that object
might admit of. This is admittedly an appeal to intuition, but just con-
sider the difference between the unique key to a lockbox, and the key
ðnow to nothingÞ passed down from your great-grandmother, or the ring
of keys to a medieval dungeon. I submit that the way we value the key in
the first case is different from the way we value the keys in the latter two,
independent of the possibility of replacements and despite the fact that,
of course, they all have histories. Below, I hope to make some headway in
explaining the nature of this difference.
It seems, then, that the fact that historically significant features
of an object are well suited to satisfy IR led us to believe that irreplace-
ability has an important role to play in our understanding of the histor-
ical mode of valuation. But this appearance is illusory. Whether or not
you would have good reason to accept a replacement for a valued object
is irrelevant to explaining the specific character of objects we value for
their histories.
V. THE VALUE OF HISTORY
Having rejected claims to the effect that irreplaceability, or even some
more tempered form of resistance to replacement, might be a necessary
or sufficient condition for warranting the historical mode of valuation,
we are left to wonder what made this picture compelling in the first place,
and whether there is in fact some common feature that unites the other-
wise diverse cases of things we value for their histories. With regard to the
first question, it seems that there is a further feature of historical prop-
erties lurking behind attributions of irreplaceability that explains why
that phenomenon has seemed a central aspect of the historical mode of
valuation. Cohen refers to it as the given. The historical features of an
object come as they are—we cannot change them, remove them, or rep-
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licate them ðthough we can of course add to them, and time may alter
their significanceÞ. The fact that these historical properties cannot be
replicated or fabricated or engineered can lead to the stronger conclu-
sion that objects valued for their histories are irreplaceable. But as we
have seen, this is manifestly not the case.
Cohen claims that we need to accept the given, that it is a mistake
to seek “mastery” over everything, to shape everything to our “aims and
requirements.”59 This position underlies a strong preservationist bent
in Cohen’s essay with which I disagree.60 And while appeal to the given
offers a kind of error theory for the common concern with irreplace-
ability, it does not yet get to the heart of the historical mode of valua-
tion. We don’t value historically significant objects for their bare “giv-
enness.” What is given need not have a significant past. The fact that
historical features are given and cannot be replicated is what makes pos-
sible their distinctive value, but that value does not lie primarily in a di-
vorce from human intention and control.
L. P. Hartley famously wrote: “The past is a foreign country: they
do things differently there.”61 As revealing as this metaphor can be, there
is a crucial dimension of our relationship to the past that it fails to cap-
ture. While we might visit a foreign country, we cannot, at least not in
the same way, visit the past.62 But the past can visit us.
The historical properties of objects offer us a genuine connection
to the past. Thoughwe cannot go back in time, the objects and places that
were present in the past travel forward in time with us. The enthusiast
who exclaims, “This is where Jefferson sat as he drafted the Declaration
of Independence!” is not mistaken in her excitement: she values a con-
nection to the past that has an immediacy that is otherwise completely
impossible. While she cannot visit eighteenth-century America, the desk
already has. It was there, and no desk that was not in fact there can be
made to have this feature post hoc. The fact that such historical features
cannot be engineered invites the conclusion that objects valued for their
histories have no substitutes or are irreplaceable. But the fact that his-
torical features cannot be fabricated does not imply that there are not
multiple objects that share the same historically significant features. The
possibility of multiple objects being historically significant in the same
way does not alter the distinctive value they possess in providing a con-
nection to the past. It should now be clear that irreplaceability is only
contingently relevant to the valuing of objects for their histories, and we
59. Cohen, “Rescuing Conservatism,” 207.
60. I discuss this further in “Engaging with the Past.”
61. L. P. Hartley, The Go-Between ðNew York: New York Review of Books, 1953Þ, 17.
62. Compare with the discussion of our “homelessness in time” and the role of per-
sonal routines and traditions in Samuel Scheffler, “The Normativity of Tradition,” in Equal-
ity and Tradition ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2010Þ, 287–311, 296–98.
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can thus see why, for instance, a historical artifact and a unique key are so
evaluatively different, despite surface similarities pertaining to replace-
ments. If we could somehow cast objects, or ourselves, back into the past,
then the connection afforded by the historical properties of objects
would not be so distinctive. But this is of course a fantasy.63 The fact that
historical features cannot be fabricated is what secures the distinctive-
ness of their value, but the value accentuated is the connection with the
past. By analogy, consider a place that still exists, though we could no
longer visit it—perhaps the moon if we permanently lost our limited
knowledge of space travel. Holding a moon rock would be a way of mak-
ing a connection with a place that is now inaccessible to us, in the same
way we can make a connection with the past through objects of histori-
cal value.
This analogy also highlights why connections with the past are val-
uable, and why it makes sense for us to seek them out in the way we
often do. Connecting with the past by engaging with historically signifi-
cant objects is a way of regaining what has been lost to the passage of
time. Mementos assist in recalling important moments in our lives, but
they also offer a visceral connection that exceeds mere reminiscence, a
kind of embodied memory. Recall the example of Cohen’s eraser. Cohen
writes: “There is no feature that stands apart from its history that makes
me want to keep this eraser.” The historical properties of a memento
or heirloom allow you to hold the past in your hand. This phenome-
non is all the more remarkable when it pushes beyond the boundaries
of our own life and allows us to connect with persons and events from
the distant past. Just like the moon rock, from a place few have ever
been to and to which few may ever go, historical artifacts expand our
access to times from which we are otherwise isolated. This kind of con-
nection can facilitate learning, understanding, and discovery, to consider
some instrumental goods, but it can also offer a sense of unity with the
significant moments that have shaped both the earth and ourselves.
In this vein, connecting with the past through historically signifi-
cant objects tends to have emotional resonance, as in the difference be-
tween my father’s ring and a perceptually identical ring that belonged
to a stranger; only the ring with the correct historical properties will
ground an appropriate disposition toward an emotional reaction. Thus,
historically significant objects can be the source of distinctive affective
experiences. In addition to these kinds of personal sentimental connec-
tions, engagement with historically significant objects of a more imper-
sonal nature ðsuch as Stonehenge or the Declaration of Independence
or the Grand CanyonÞ also can involve characteristic phenomenological
63. Indeed, in such a fantasy, our conception of past, present, and future might be
so distorted as to make the concept of a historical mode of valuation unintelligible.
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components, sometimes akin to the experience of awe or respect, other
times wonder or even revulsion ðas when confronted by objects signifi-
cant for their connection with a history of oppression and violenceÞ.64
I am inclined to believe that valuing objects for their histories in the
way we have been discussing is a kind of aesthetic valuing, broadly con-
ceived, that unites the seemingly disparate kinds of cases considered in
this essay. But I will not pursue that suggestion here.
For these reasons, it is not any old connection to any old past that
is worth valuing. Although age may sometimes be sufficient to secure
value when an object is incredibly old, typically we are concerned not
with mere age value, but rather, historical significance.65 Thus, the value
of the connection to the past is premised on standard attributions of his-
torical significance of the type discussed in attempting to justify claims
about irreplaceability. This is why a justified articulation of historical sig-
nificance remains a central aspect of the historical mode of valuation.
We value objects that have visited historically significant times, but more-
over, that have done so in historically significant ways. This piece of lint
may have escaped the fire of London, but no one rightly gives a hoot
about that.
It may be questioned whether historically significant objects are
worth valuing in the manner I have suggested. What, it might be asked,
does the connection with the past afforded by historically significant
objects achieve that is lacked by merely reflecting upon the significance
of the past? Are not such objects like totems to which we attribute power
as a matter of cultural practice, but which are merely props or prompts
for the mental activity that truly bears the relevant value?
However, I do not find this line of thought particularly compel-
ling. The intuition that began this investigation, that historically signifi-
cant objects are irreplaceable, already adopted the position that the ob-
jects themselves ðand not merely historical reflectionÞ were the bearers
of value, and so the importance of connecting with the past via such
objects already has common opinion on its side. Moreover, though, why
think that merely mental reflection upon significant moments in time
is a complete form of engagement with their value, any more so than
merely mental reflection upon the significance of place? Surely, con-
templating a significant place ðwhether beautiful or unique or politically
chargedÞ can be a valuable activity, but it would be strange to doubt that
64. Though I argue in “Engaging with the Past” that sentimental value can accrue
to objects that are traditionally regarded as impersonally valuable. In this I diverge from
Guy Fletcher, “Sentimental Value,” Journal of Value Inquiry 43 ð2009Þ: 55–65; and Anthony
Hatzimoysis, “Sentimental Value,” Philosophical Quarterly 53 ð2003Þ: 373–79.
65. For some further thoughts about age value vs. historical value, see Carolyn Kors-
meyer, “Aesthetic Deception: On Encounters with the Past,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Crit-
icism 66 ð2008Þ: 117–27.
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visiting such a place would afford a valuable connection that is lacking
in mere reflection—so, too, for historically significant objects. As I have
explained, such objects afford as close of a connection to the past as
our natural laws allow, and thus a connection with time analogous to the
connection with place. Indeed, we value many places precisely because
of their historical significance. Think of visiting the Gettysburg battle-
fields. Standing at the site of Pickett’s Charge, one can be overwhelmed
with the weight of the bloody and momentous events that transpired
there. It was once common to attribute this force to ghosts, but I have
suggested that this connection to the past is a phenomenon we rightly
value and can be emotionally disposed toward in a relatedmanner. More-
over, the character of the historical mode of valuation naturally varies
in relation to the kind of historical significance with which one makes
contact. Gettysburg tends to conjure quite different evaluative attitudes
and emotions compared with a childhood haunt or the great redwood
forests. But in each case, the common core is a significant connection
with a significant past.
VI. CONCLUSION
While it initially appeared that objects we value for their histories are
irreplaceable, and that this irreplaceability was a defining aspect of the
historical mode of valuation, we have seen that this is not the case. The
extent to which an object resists replacement must be justified through
demonstrating that it is valuable in a way that differs from potential sub-
stitutes. But even the maximally differentiable value of a given histori-
cally significant object may be insufficient to secure its irreplaceability.
Multiple historically significant objects can be valuable in the same way.
We were prompted to believe in the irreplaceability of such objects by
the fact that historical properties are given and hence cannot be fabri-
cated. However, the inability to fabricate a property is not equivalent to
the inability to replace it with another object that is valuable in the same
way. The fact that historical properties cannot be fabricated plays an im-
portant role in making the historical mode of valuation distinctive, but it
is the connection to the past afforded by historical properties that makes
their bearers valuable.
We often remark on the impossibility of time travel, but of course
it is only travel backward in time to which we refer. Everything travels
forward in time, and in that journey we can encounter objects that have
traversed times that are beyond our own direct access. We rightly value
the historical connection these objects provide, the opportunity to come
as close as we can to visiting the past.
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